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COMMENTS ON "GENERAL FAILURE OF 
LOGIC PROGRAMS" 
JOXAN JAFFAR,* JEAN-LOUIS LASSEZ, AND MICHAEL J. MAHER** 
t> The paper [1] purports to present a classification of the general failure sets 
of logic programs and a simple proof of the theorem on the soundness and 
completeness of the negation-as-failure rule. In this note we clarify some 
conflicting terminology between [1] and the papers [2, 3] to which it pre- 
dominantly refers. Our main purpose, however, is to point out major errors, 
in particular, one in the proof of the above mentioned theorem. <1 
INTRODUCTION 
In [1], results are claimed to be established about general failure sets, ground general 
failure sets and negation as failure. In a first part of this note we show that crucial 
definitions used in [1] are not equivalent to those in the literature, even though the 
notations and terminology are the same. This confusion invalidates the claims that a 
conjecture from [3] has been solved and that new proofs of classical results have 
been found. In a second part we show that in any case the main results of [1] are 
wrong. Similar confusions and erroneous results are to be found in a follow up paper 
by the same author [7]. 
NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY 
The major conflict between [1] and [2, 3] lies in the definition of general failure sets. 
In what follows, we use underscores to distinguish between otation from [1] which 
is in conflict with [2,3] and the symbols P and E to denote an arbitrary logic 
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program and equality theory respectively. In [2, 3], two kinds of general failure sets 
were introduced: 
(a) GF(P, E), the general failure set, is the set of those ground atoms all of 
whose fair (P, E)-derivations are finitely failed. No inductive definition for 
this set was presented. 
(b) GGF(P, E), the ground general failure set, is the set of ground atoms all of 
whose ground fair (P, E)-derivations are finitely failed. An inductive defini- 
tion of this set was given as the union, over all ordinals a, of a transfinite 
sequence of sets GGF0(P, E), GGFI(P, E), GGF2(P, E), . . . .  
It was proven that these two sets are, in general different. 
In [1], a predicate F(B, n i, Ai, k), where B is a ground atom and k < to, was 
defined. In case k = to, the defining sentence is infinite. The sets GF(P, E) and 
GGF(P, E) in [1] can then expressed as follows: 
(a) GF(P ,E )= {B: F(B,n~,A~,I)}. An inductive definition of the sets 
GF k (P, E), k < to, was given. 
(b) GGF(P, E) -- {B: _F(B, n~, A i, k) for some k < to}. An inductive definition 
of the sets GGF`,(P, E) was given exactly as in [2, 3]. 
We now observe that 
GF(P,E)4:GF(P,E) and GF(P,E)q:GGF(P,E). (1) 
A simple example will prove both the above inequations. 
EXAMPLE 1. Take the program P: 
p(a),--q(X), 
q(f(X)),--q(X), 
consider E = { }, i.e. as in pure PROLOG, and let HB denote the Herbrand base for 
this program. In this case, GF(P, E )=HB-{p(a)} ,  GF(P ,E )= HB, 
GGF(P, E )= HB, and lICK}F,,, the union of GGF`,(P, E), over all a, is HB. 
It follows immediately from the definitions in [1] that GFk(P,E)= 
GGF,.,+k(P, E), and so 
V, e) = C F2o( v, e) (2) 
A further difference in terminology in [1] from [2, 3] lies in the definition of 
(P, E)-derivation sequences. In [2,3], a derivation sequence was defined as a 
sequence of goals, each of which may contain variables. Goals are derived from 
preexxling ones using E-tmitiers. Ground derivation sequences were then defined to 
be derivation sequences where only Wound E-unifiers are employed. In [1], deriva- 
tion sequences are based upon sequences of lists of ground instances of clauses. A 
"single derivation sequence" corresponds to a ground derivation sequence in [2, 3]. A 
"(P, E)-derivation sequence", for a single goal, encapsulates all single derivation 
sequences for that goal. The important point to note is that the operational model in 
[1] differs from that in [2, 3]; in particular: 
derivation sequences in [1] correspond only to the ground erivation 
sequen  in [2, 31. (3) 
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We summarize this section as follows. From (1) on, none of the general failure 
sets GF(P, E) = OGF,,(P, E), GFF(P, E), and ~F~(P ,  E) defined in [1] corre- 
spond to GF(P, E) in [2,3]. Thus, for example, the problem of an inductive 
definition for GF(P, E) has not been addressed at all. GF(P, E), by definition, is 
concerned only with ground derivations. Equation (2) shows that GF(P, E) is, in 
fact, determined solely by the GGF~(P, E). In contrast, no such relationship (2) 
exists between GF(P, E) and the GGF,,(P, E), that is, there is no ordinal a such 
that GF(P, E)= GGF,,(P, E) for all P and E. On the issue of negation as failure, 
Points (1) and (3) show that, in [1], the notions of failure and negation as failure are 
different from [2, 3]. For example, when E = ( } and we are considering programs in 
pure PROLOG, the notion of failure in [1] is not equivalent to the notion of failure 
as used by Clark [4]. 
TECHNICAL MATrERS 
We address three major technical points in [1], the first of which concerns Proposi- 
tion 3. This proposition is wrong; as stated, the proposition implies that 
GGF0(P, E )= GGFI(P, E), and this in turn implies that GGFo(P, E )= 
GGF~(P, E) for any ordinal a. Two possible alternatives to this proposition are: 
Proposition 3a. For any limit ordinal a < 60 2 and ground atom B, we have B 
GGF,~(P, E) iff F(B, n i, Ai, k,) ,  where k~ is the number of limit ordinals less 
than a. 
Proposition 3b. For any ground atom B, 
(i) for integers k > 0 and h > O, B ~ GGFk,~+h(P, E) iff Sh(B) = { } or VC 
Sh(B), F(C, n i, A i, k), and 
(iJ) for k>0,  B ~ GGFk~,(P, E ) iff F(B, n~, A~, k -  I). 
We further note that Proposition 3b(ii) is equivalent to Proposition 3a. 
The second point we raise concerns the meaning of the statement F(B, n ~, A i, k) 
(cf. p. 162 in [I]) when k = ~. No  definition for the meaning of this infinite sentence 
is given in [I]. It follows from Proposition 3a that 
F(B, n i, Ai, O) iff B ~ GGF, o(P, E), 
F(B, n,, A~,I) iff B ~ GGF2,~(P, E), 
F(B, ni, A~,2) iff B ~ GGF3o,(P, E), 
F( B, ni, Ai, i) iff B ~ GGF<i+I)~,(P, E), 
One might be led to believe, from this sequence, that 
iff B C Fo (P,E) 
However, it is easily ascertainable that Proposition 4 in [1] (which is given without a 
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proof) is correct if and only if 
iff BEC F (e,e), 
where f] is the least nonconstructive ordinal. For this reason, and the fact that 
Theorem 1, one of the two main results in [1], is equivalent to Proposition 4, a 
formal definition for the meaning of F(B, n,, A~, ~) is required. 
Our third and final point concerns the other main result in [1], Corollary 2. 
Assuming Theorem 1 in [t], this corollary is wrong. The following is a simple 
counterexample: take P= {r (c )~,  s (d )~} and E= { }, so that P is a pure 
PROLOG program. The ground atom r (d)~ GGF(P, E), but -~r(d) is not a 
logical consequence of (P*, E). The corollary does not hold for this example in 
particular because E does not forbid c = d. In general, there is, in [1], no notion of 
completeness of the underlying equality theory E as in, for example, [4] (which uses 
a particular set of axioms) and [2,3] (which use unification-complete equality 
theories). 
Corollary 2 in [1] remains wrong even when the equality theory e is complete in 
the sense of [2, 3]. For example, let e be the equality theory given by [4] so that E is 
unification-complete [2,3]. A counterexample can then be obtained by using yet 
again the pure PROLOG program in Example 1: p(a) ~ GGF(P, E) but ~p(a) is 
not a logical consequence of (P*, E) (cf. problem section, Chapter 3 in [5]). The 
corollary does not hold for this example in particular because only E-models are 
considered. If logical consequence is considered only with respect o this restricted 
class of interpretations, i.e. the corollary reads 
Corollary 2~ (P*, E) ~ E ~B/ f ib  ~.GGF(P, E), then this corollary, which follows 
trivially from results in [3], does not address the issues of soundness and 
completeness of the negation-as-failure rule in the sense of [2, 3, 4, 5, 6], 
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